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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RAE ADAMSON,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Petitioner/Appellant,
-vs-

Appellate Case No. 20010516-CA

RANAE ADAMSON,
Respondent/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

RESPONDENT/APPELLEE (hereinafter "Respondent") submits the following as
her brief in the above matter.
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order
herein, which is the Order denying Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, pursuant to the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a3(2)(h).
1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
The matter before the trial court was a "Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce",
and the matter being appealed before this Court is the "Order Denying the Petition to
Modify."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented on appeal: For purposes of this appeal, is
Appellant/Petitioner's case ripe for review by this Court? For purposes of this appeal,
did the court abuse its discretion in finding that there was not a substantial and material
change in circumstances warranting a modification of alimony? For purposes of this
appeal, trial courts are in the best position to modify awards of alimony.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. CASES. STATUES AND RULES
The following statutes and cases are applicable to the disposition of this appeal:
U.C.A. Section 30-3-5(7); Adelman v. Adelman. 815 P.2d 741, (UT App 1991);
Johnson v.Johnson. 855 P.2d 250 (UT App 1993); Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake City
Commission. 624 P.2d 1138 (UT 1981); and Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103
(UT App 1999).

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court has the "continuing jurisdiction" discretion to deny a modification
in an alimony order, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) and (ii), if the
court determines that the party petitioning the court has not reached his burden of
demonstrating a substantial and material change in circumstances.
The Appellate Court reviews these issues under the "Abuse of Discretion"
standard.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent relies upon Petitioner's statement of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties to this action were husband and wife, but were divorced on February
9, 1989, in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County. See Exhibit "C." The court
entered a permanent alimony obligation to Petitioner in the amount of $200.00 per month
on behalf of the Respondent to become effective the date the decree was entered. Decree
of Divorce at ^f 11. The entire reference to alimony contained in the Findings of Fact
read as follows:
Both parties to this action are able-bodied and employable. However, Defendant
[Respondent] is in need of support. It is reasonable, just, and proper that Plaintiff
[Petitioner] be ordered to pay to the Defendant the sum of Two Hundred Dollars
3

($200.00) per month, as and for alimony, commencing with the month of February
1989, and continuing until the death of the Plaintiff or Defendant, or until
Defendant's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs, or until further
order of this court. This award of alimony is subject to review by the court on
July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m. before the assigned judge.
Findings of Fact at Tf 13. The alimony award did not change after the review date.
The trial court that adjudicated the divorce action, also specifically addressed the
Petitioner's retirement benefits. The court acknowledged that Petitioner would have
benefits as a result of retirement and made an order in regard to the division of these
benefits. The entire reference to retirement benefits contained in the Findings of Fact
read as follows:
[Petitioner] has acquired an interest in a retirement plan through his employment
with the State of Utah, which should be divided equally between the parties
according to the Woodward Formula, and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
should issue from this Court.
Findings of Fact at Tj 12.
Petitioner brought his petition to modify because he was reaching retirement age
and expressed that he wanted to retire. At the time of the trial, Petitioner had reached
retirement age, however had made the choice to continue working. To date, Petitioner
has not retired, he maintains his employment and has not experienced substantial and
material changes in his work status.

The trial court denied the Petition to Modify.

4

Despite being of retirement age and wishing to retire, the Petitioner had not retired
because claims that he cannot afford to retire and continue to pay the small amount of
alimony awarded to the Respondent. The trial court found:
The Petitioner has not retired from employment, to date, despite his eligibility to
do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation to pay alimony will
continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that he will be unable to meet his
expenses on a reduced income from retirement, if the alimony obligation
continues. This was the Petitioner's stated purpose for bringing his petition to
modify the alimony obligation to terminate the obligation.
Findings of Fact at ^f 12.
The trial court appropriately found that the Petitioner's impending retirement was
not a substantial material change in circumstances. The trial court repeatedly makes
reference to the fact that Petitioner has chosen at the present time not to retire. The court
further notes that:
[T]he ruling that Judge Rigtrup made in the original divorce decree certainly
contemplates retirement. If it didn't, [Respondent] would not have been awarded
a percentage of [Petitioner's] retirement. At the same time, it awards alimony that
goes past age 65. That's clear, too. So I would surmise that Judge Rigtrup meant
that the alimony payment should go on [sic] retirement.
Record, at 53, lines 5-16.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioner brought a Petition to Modify the parties' Decree of Divorce as to the
issue of alimony. Petitioner based his petition upon the expectation that he was
considering retirement, and this future event constituted a material and substantial change
in circumstance. Petitioner further claimed, that he would not be able to afford to retire
and pay alimony to the Respondent. Therefore, Petitioner requested that the Court
modify the parties' Decree of Divorce and terminate Respondent's permanent alimony
award. The trial court denied the Petitioner's Petition to Modify.
The trial court determined that the underlying basis for Petitioner's Petition to
Modify did not rise to the standard of demonstrating that a material and substantial
change in circumstances had occurred since the entry of the Decree of Divorce, which
may warrant a modification of the alimony.

Petitioner had not retired at the time that he

filed the petition and he asked the Court to consider the possibility of future events
occurring, when ruling on this matter. Future events being Petitioner's impending
retirement, that Respondent will apply for and receive social security benefits. Petitioner
maintained that these would be material and substantial changes in circumstances not
contemplated by the original court in issuing the Decree of Divorce.

6

The future retirement and social security benefits of the parties should be
considered issues that are not ripe before the Court and therefore Petitioner's Petition to
Modify was appropriately denied. The Utah Supreme Court notes that when parties find
themselves in a position that may sometime in the future happen, this question is not ripe
before the court for adjudication. Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission, 624
P.2d 1138 (UT 1981).
The Court could not consider Petitioner's Petition to Modify in that his
circumstances had no substantially and material changed since the Decree was entered.
The Petitioner having not yet retired, makes it inappropriate for the Court to consider this
as a material change since it had not yet happened. The Court appropriately did not make
rulings or issue orders upon the parties' based upon the hope that these circumstances
may occur.
The Court determined that Petitioner had not met his burden demonstrating the
material and substantial change in circumstances. It determined that the court having
issued the original Decree of Divorce took into consideration the future of the parties'
financial circumstances when it issued the permanent alimony award.
The Court further noted, that it believed that the original trial court took into
consideration the Petitioner's retirement in issuing the alimony award to Respondent.
7

The original trial court specifically addressed Petitioner's future retirement and
Respondent's ongoing financial hardships when it issued the alimony.
Finally, when the Court made a note of the parties' financial situations, it used
approximations to measure the monetary value of parties' fiiture financial circumstances.
The Appellate Court has noted that it is the trial court that should consider current
evidence of the parties' financial situations, in that their circumstances may have changed
during the appeal. Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (UT App 1999).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY BECAUSE
PETITIONER DID NOT HAVE AN ISSUE RIPE BEFORE THE
COURT AND FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WAS A
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE TIME OF THE PARTIES'
DIVORCE.

Petitioner was almost 66 years old when his petition to modify came before the
trial court. The parties were divorced on the 20 th day of March, 1989. The divorce
decree provided two important applicable provisions: Petitioner was ordered to divide
and share the equity in his retirement equally with the Respondent; and Petitioner was
further ordered to pay Respondent alimony in the amount of $200.00 per month to
continue until Respondent remarries, cohabits or either party dies. Petitioner brings his
8

petition to modify based upon the possibility that he may retire soon, and it would be a
financial burden for him to continue to pay alimony.
The trial court properly found that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate that a
substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred since the parties' decree
of divorce. The issue of Petitioner's pending retirement goes to the heart of his case,
however this argument is fundamentally flawed. The retirement which Petitioner is
asking to be considered the substantial change necessary to modify the divorce decree, in
fact has not occurred. Because the Petitioner's central issue to his case, has not
transpired, this case is not ripe for ruling before the court.
It is well settled law in Utah that the Court can not render decisions that are not
ripe for adjudication. The Utah Court of Appeals affirms this position in Adelman v.
Adelman, 815 P.2d 741 (UT App 1991). The Adelman case was brought before the
court on appeal from an order to show cause clarifying in part, enforcing in part, and
modifying in part from a divorce decree of the parties. Mr. Adelman claimed that the
trial court erred in awarding Ms. Adelman survivorship benefits in the modification. The
parties both agreed that Ms. Adelman had in fact remarried before the age of fifty-five
which would render her ineligible for the survivor benefits. However, Ms. Adelman
further contended that her survivorship benefits could be reinstated if her current
9

marriage ended in divorce, annulment, or widowhood. The Appellate Court determined
that the issue was inappropriate for review since the issue was not ripe. "Ripeness occurs
when "a conflict over the application of a legal provision [has] sharpened into an actual
or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between parties thereto." Aclelman v.
Addrnan, 815P.2d741; Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake City Commission, 624 P.2d 1138
(UT 1981) (Emphasis added).
In the case at hand, Petitioner, Mr. Adamson, is asking the court to rule on an
event in the future that has not transpired.

Mr. Adamson has not retired, and is asking

the Court to terminate the alimony award based upon the possibility of this event
occurring. Petitioner asks the court to speculate that when or if this event happens, it
should be considered a substantial change in circumstances in order to modify the
parties' decree of divorce. It is undisputed that Petitioner/Appellant has not retired. The
Petitioner is therefore asking the Court to rule on an issue that is not ripe before the
Court. Despite the fact that Petitioner claims that he wants to retire, there is no actual
issue before the Court, only the hypothetical situation that he will retire. Petitioner
further encumbers the court with additional complexities that said retirement would
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cause Petitioner a financial hardship if he was to continue paying Respondent alimony.
The trial court found:
The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his eligibility
to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation to pay alimony will
continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that he will be unable to meet his
expenses on a reduced income from retirement, if the alimony obligation
continues. This was the Petitioner's stated purpose for bringing his petition to
modify the alimony obligation to termination that obligation.
Findings of Fact at ^| 16. (Emphasis added).
The Utah Supreme Court states that "[w]here there exists no more than a
difference of opinion regarding the hypothetical application of [an insurance provision]
to a situation in which the parties might, at some future time, find themselves, the
question is unripe for adjudication." Boyle et. al. V. National Fire Insurance Company,
866 P.2d 595 at 597 (UT App 1993); Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake County Commission,
624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (UT 1981). In the case at hand, Petitioner is asking the court to
rule on a hypothetical question. The court acknowledges that if the parties were to
change their positions, (i.e. Petitioner retire & Respondent waive alimony) it would be of
benefit to both parties. However, since the question before the court has not yet
happened, the court cannot force the parties to act in a reasonable manner. MThe
Respondent's refusal to waive further alimony in this case, in order to induce the

11

Petitioner to retire, so that she can receive his retirement benefits, which are greater than
the alimony, is not reasonable in the premises. However, the court cannot require the
parties to behave reasonably in settlement discussions." (Findings of Fact at % 20). It is
clear from this finding that the court felt that its hands were tied, since the Petitioner had
not actually retired. "If any action is ripe for adjudication, it is within the court's
discretion to either grant or deny a party's request for declaratory relief. If on the other
hand, an action is not ripe for adjudication, it is not within the trial court's discretion to
grant declaratory relief, but instead the trial court must dismiss the action as a matter of
law." Boyle, et. al. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company. 866 P.2d 595 at 598 (UT
App 1993). The Utah Supreme Court notes that it was improper for a trial court to
address certain issues, because the case itself was not "ripe" before the court. "The
proper course would have been to dismiss for lack of ripeness. We may, however,
'affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the court, even if it is
one not relied on below.'" Salt Lake County v. Bangerter. 928 P.2d 384 (UT 1996).
Based upon the mere possibility that Petitioner will at some point in the near
future retire from his employment and begin to collect retirement benefits is not an
adequate basis for his request to modify the divorce decree. The case at hand is not ripe
for adjudication and the Court correctly dismissed Petitioner's Petition to Modify.
12

POINT 2

IF PETITIONER RETIRED, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ABUSE IT'S DISCRETION BY DENYING PETITIONER'S
PETITION TO MODIFY THE ALIMONY AWARD ON THE BASIS
THAT IT FOUND THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN A
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES.

The facts of this case support the argument that the trial court that issued the
original alimony award contemplated the totality of the parties' circumstances both at the
time of the trial and on a long term basis. This is evidenced in several points of fact set
forth in the record. The trial court specifically makes an alimony award that has no
termination date, until certain events occur, (i.e. remarriage, cohabitation, or death of one
of the parties, whichever occurs first). The Petitioner is ordered to pay Respondent
$200.00 per month in alimony. Then the Court also addresses the fact that the Petitioner
will have retirement to which Respondent is entitled and awarded one-half. In the
Finding of Facts ^f 15, the Court orders Respondent to pay child support in the amount of
$75.00 per month. The Court clearly recognized that Respondent would have a difficult
time in paying her support obligation in that it stated "[i]n any month when the
[respondent] fails to make an actual monetary payment to [petitioner] for child support,
the child support shall be deducted from [respondent's] lien upon the marital residence of
the parties." The court recognized that Respondent had an ongoing and permanent
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financial need and offset her obligations in her equity, rather than in her alimony income.
It seems clear that the court took many things into consideration when computing
alimony in this original decree including the ongoing permanent need that Respondent
would have for this income. The court in the Petitioner's Petition to Modify specifically
finds that: 'The [trial] court did not order initially that alimony would terminate upon the
Petitioner's retirement, or at any other time, other than the Petitioner's death or
Respondent's death, remarriage or cohabitation, and from this the court concludes that
the trial court originally did not intend alimony ever to terminate." Findings of Facts at ^
23.
The trial court has the discretion and continuing jurisdiction to make
modifications as to divorce decrees pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-5(3). "However, where a
future change in circumstances is contemplated by the trial court in the divorce decree,
the fulfillment of that future change will not constitute a material change in
circumstances sufficient to modify the award." Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (UT
App 1993). "A change in circumstances reasonably contemplated at the time of divorce
is not legally cognizable as a substantial change in circumstances in modification
proceedings." Dana v. Dana. 789 P.2d 726, 729 (UT App 1990). The Court reasoned in
the Johnson case that "[s]ince the trial court in the instant case divided the pension plan
14

between the parties, it was cognizant of Mrs. Johnson's ability to receive additional
income in the future that would alter her financial condition and needs." Johnson v.
Johnson. 855 P.2d 250 (UT App 1993).
Petitioner relies on the Bollinger v. Bollinger, 997 P.2d 903, (UT App 2000) case
to support their argument. The Bollinger case, however, provides an additional fact
situation that the case at hand does not possess. In Bollinger, the husband who was
ordered to pay alimony, petitioned the court to modify the decree, based in part upon his
"unexpected early retirement" Id. at 3. The early retirement coupled with Petitioner's
receipt of social security was the basis for the Petition to Modify. In the instant case, the
retirement of Petitioner is foreseeable, and not unexpected. The trial court specifically
addresses the fact that there are retirement benefits that would be derived from
Petitioner's retirement. Most people become eligible for retirement benefits at the age of
sixty-five (65) and Petitioner is no different. He is currently 66 years old and eligible to
reap the benefits of retirement. However, by his own choice, Petitioner has failed to
retire and maintains his employment.
"To succeed on a petition to modify a divorce decree, the moving party must first
show that a substantial material change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of
the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself." Id. at 11. The responsibility is
15

therefore placed upon Petitioner to establish that there indeed has been a material change
that has happened, not contemplated in the original divorce. Petitioner has failed to meet
his burden in demonstrating such a change, therefore the court appropriately denied the
petition to modify. The retirement which he claims as the basis for the Petition to
Modify has not occurred. The present findings of fact for the Petition to Modify
specifically address a reasonable belief that the original trial court took into consideration
the Petitioner's retirement when determining the alimony award.
POINT 3:

IF A SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGE IN
CIRCUMSTANCES COULD BE FOUND, THE ALIMONY AWARD
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR MORE SPECIFIC FINDINGS AS
TO THE PARTIES' FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

Petitioner contends that upon a finding that there have been a substantial and
material change in circumstances, that there is no need for the matter to be remanded to
the trial court for recalculate alimony. Petitioner maintains that there is a sufficient basis
to terminate the alimony award. The Court in Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103
(UT App 1999) supports this premise:
"[T]he power to terminate [alimony] should be exercised with caution and only
after full consideration of the circumstances of the parties. . . .?f 24 Am. Jur. 2d
Divorce and Separation § 813 (1998) (emphasis added). We note, for the trial
court's guidance on remand, that for the trial court to terminate [an] alimony
award, there must be an articulated basis for doing so, i.e., the court must be
persuaded that [the recipient spouse] will be able to support [him- or] herself at a
16

standard of living to which [he or] she was accustomed during the parties'
marriage, or that [the payor spouse] is no longer able to pay.
(Williamson at 12).
The Williamson Court goes on to note that the trial court should take into consideration
the payor's loss of income, but that fact alone should not be enough to rationalize a
complete termination of alimony. The termination of an alimony award should be done
with caution.

In Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (UT App 1990) the trial court

terminated an alimony award to the wife upon her reaching the age of sixty-two.

The

Appellate court disagreed and found the following:
In the present case, appellant is a woman in her late fifties, who, while in
reasonably good health, has never been substantially employed and has not
developed any employable skills. It is similarly unrealistic to assume that she will
ever be able to provide for herself at any reasonable level. Therefore, the trial
court abused its discretion in terminating her alimony award at age sixty-two.
(Munns at 122).
In the case before the Court, Respondent, Ms. Adamson, is in her sixties, has limited job
skills and has been determined to be disabled. The court in Moon v. Moon. 973 P.2d
431, 438 (UT App 1999), states that "the trial court should consider current evidence of
the parties' financial situations, as their 'circumstances . . . may have changed during this
appeal.'"

17

As to the Petitioner and Respondent, it would be very difficult to accurately
ascertain the financial situation of the parties. Petitioner has not yet retired, Respondent
has not applied for her Social Security benefits, and the trial court itself notes in its
Findings several times that it approximates the parties' future financial positions. The
termination or alteration of an alimony award should be based upon facts not
approximations. Therefore, this court should not terminate Respondent's alimony award
and if it deems necessary, should leave this to the discretion of the trial court.
POINT 4

APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES ON
APPEAL BECAUSE APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO
ABIDE BY THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT

The trial court ordered both parties to bear their own substantial attorney's fees,
which neither party has appealed (Findings Tf 21). When presented with this same
situation (with a similar denial of the termination of alimony) in Carter v. Carter, 584
P.2d 904 (Utah 1978), the court agreed with defendant / appellee's argument that she
should be entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal. The court's justification was
simply "that inasmuch as the plaintiff was unwilling to abide by the trial court's
judgment, and that [defendant] has been put to the necessity of defending this appeal, the
plaintiff should have to bear the costs thereof, including reasonable attorney's fees for her
counsel." (Carter at 906).
18

Appellee Ranae Adamson is disabled, and appellant has refused to voluntarily pay
any portion of her alimony, absent court enforcement, from the date of the original
decree of divorce. Appellee is entitled to attorney's fees for having to defend this appeal
when her only source of income is Social Security Disability and the alimony ordered to
be paid by Appellant. Appellee requests that attorney fees and costs be awarded on
appeal, and that the case be remanded for the purpose of determining and awarding her
such attorneys fees as the trial court finds to be reasonable and properly incurred on this
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's arguments for appeal are fundamentally flawed. The basis for
Petitioner's petition to modify is primarily based upon the premise that he may retire at
some time in the future. Since the central issue to Petitioner's appeal has not occurred,
the matter is not ripe for appeal and therefore the Court should deny Petitioner's request
for relief.
Despite the fact that the issues are not ripe, the premise for Petitioner's substantial
and material change in circumstances stems again from the retirement issue. Petitioner's
retirement may only be considered substantial and material so long as it was not
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contemplated in the original decree of divorce. The burden is upon Petitioner to
demonstrate that he has satisfied both of these prongs, which he fails to do.
Finally, if this court were to deem it appropriate to recalculate the alimony
amount, that should be remanded to the trial court to make an accurate and current
determination as to the alimony award based upon the parties' present situations.
For the reasons stated in Respondent's arguments, this court should deny all
aspects of Petitioner's appeal and award Respondent costs and attorney's fees in
defending this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

clay of YJL(JA3LJ

NATHAN D. RACE
STACEY G. SCHMIDT
Attorneys for Appellee/Respondent
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

RAE ADAMSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER DENYING PETITION TO
MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
-vs-

Civil No. 874904654DA

RANAE ADAMSON,

Judge Stephen L. Henriod
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.

Respondent.

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER having come before the court for trial on April 17,
2001, Petitioner appearing in person and by and through his counsel of record, Mary C.
Corporon, Respondent appearing in person and by and through her counsel of record,
Nathan Pace, the court having proceeded to hear the testimony of the parties and having
received the exhibits of the parties, the court having heard the arguments of counsel and
having reviewed the file and the pleadings contained therein, based thereon and for good
cause appearing, the court now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1

The parties to this action were divorced by a decree of divorce entered in
the above-entitled case in 1989

2.

At the time of the divorce of the parties, they had been married for a
period of time between 17 and 18 years

3.

At the time of the divorce, the parties were the parents of minor children,
all of whom have now achieved their majority

However, the Petitioner

testified and the court finds that the Petitioner has an adult son residing
with him, and that the Petitioner is supporting the youngest child of these
two parties in serving a religious mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Petitioner was
awarded custody of the parties' children, subject to Respondent's rights of
visitation The Respondent was ordered to pay child support for the
parties' children of $75 00 per month per child, and the court, within the
—decree of divorce, specifically awarded Respondent an interest in the
marital residence, but provided that her child support obligation would be
set off against her home equity The court now finds that the trial court's
prior determination to allow a set-off of child support against home equity
constituted a finding by the court in the initial proceedings herein that the

n

Respondent could not be relied upon to pay support regularly to the
parties' children
4

Pursuant to the decree of divorce, the Respondent was awarded alimony
from the Petitioner in the sum of $200 00 per month The Petitioner failed
to pay any of his alimony timely, and a judgment for alimony arrearages
was previously entered against him in the above-entitled court, in the sum
of $16,900 00 The Petitioner paid that to Respondent in a lump sum to
satisfy this judgment early in the year 2000 Respondent has testified and
the court finds that the Respondent has expended the entirety of the lump
sum payment for these alimony arrearages in repaying a loan to her
brother and, in paying her utilities and her usual and routine living
expenses

5.

The Respondent did not pay any of her child support to the Petitioner,
and eventually the entire amount of her child support was withheld from
her equitable lien in the marital residence As a result thereof, the
Respondent's equitable lien in the residence was extinguished, and
Respondent has no remaining interest in the equity in the marital
residence

J

6.

The court finds that each party has been a "deadbeat," to some extent,
the Petitioner for failure to pay alimony timely as previously ordered — the
Respondent for failure to pay child support for the parties' minor children
during their minority when they were in need of actual support.

7.

The court ordered the Petitioner to be taken into a holding cell to show
him what the court can do with men who refuse to obey court orders.

8.

The Petitioner was 65 years of age at the time of trial in this action and
will achieve the age of 66 years within approximately one month from the
date of trial herein.

9.

Based upon the court's observations of the Petitioner at trial, his
demeanor and appearance, and based upon this court's finding that there
is a cultural expectation in our society that persons can retire from fulltime employment at the age of 65, the court finds that it is reasonable, just
and proper that the Petitioner retire at this time.

10.

The Respondent herein is 58 years of age. The Respondent is not
currently employed and has not been employed at all since the entry of
the decree of divorce herein. The Respondent testified and the court
finds that the Respondent did not ever make any application for any
employment since the entry of the decree of divorce, as previously

4

ordered by the court The Respondent has testified that she did not make
application for employment because of her disability

The court finds that

she has not endeavored to improve her situation The court finds
Respondent could have done so, if she had tried and if she had wanted
to
11.

The Respondent receives Social Security Disability benefits in the sum of
$530 00 per month The Respondent testified that she did not receive
any other income from any other source, including food stamps or public
assistance

However, the Respondent does receive the benefit of public

housing, and her rent for her apartment is approximately $87 00 per
month after the subsidy, for an apartment usually renting for $500 00 per
month
12.

The Respondent has reasonable and necessary living expenses, in
addition to $87 00 per month for rent, of $150 00 per month for utilities,
$250 00 per month for food and household supplies, and that she is
entitled to incur reasonable expenses for such things as clothing or
transportation

The Respondent does not have a motor vehicle nor does

she have a telephone

She testified to the court from the witness stand

that she is physically able to ride the city bus

5

13

The Respondent was married to the Pet.tl0ner for a period of time in
excess of 10 years and the Petitioner has now ach!eved the age of 65
Accordingly, the court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to obtain Social
Security retirement benefits from the Social Security Administration,
based upon the Petitioner's receiving Social Security retirement benefits
However, the Respondent has failed to make application for these
benefits The court finds that, were she to apply for Social Security
retirement benefits those benefits would be received by her in the sum of
approximately $500 00 to $700 00 per month

14

The Respondent is entitled to rece.ve a portion of the Petitioner's
retirement benefits, based upon her marriage to the Petitioner during a
period of time when he was also employed by his current employer, the
State of Utah The court finds that, therefore, the Respondent would be
entitled to rece.ve approximately 25% of the actual ret.rement benefit
awarded to the Petitioner, or approximately $6,500 00 per year or
$541 66 per month, upon the Petitioner's retirement from full-time
employment

15

The court finds that, were the Petitioner to retire from his employment with
the State of Utah and were Respondent to receive Social Security

6

retirement benefits and her portion of the Petitioner's retirement, the
Respondent would be in a significantly better economic position than she
is at the present time, receiving Social Security disability benefits and
alimony from the Petitioner in the sum of $200 00 per month
16

The Petitioner has not retired from his employment, to date, despite his
eligibility to do so, because he alleges he is concerned that the obligation
to pay alimony will continue past his retirement, and he is concerned that
he will be unable to meet his expenses on a reduced income from
retirement, if the alimony obligation continues

This was the Petitioner's

stated purpose for bringing his petition to modify the alimony obligation to
terminate that obligation
17

The Petitioner is employed by the State of Utah Division o* Child and
Family Services as a social worker

His gross annual income is

approximately $40,000 00, or $3,333 33 per month

From this is withheld

federal and state taxes of approximately $848 00, and his net income is
$2,485 33 per month
18

In addition to the foregoing income from his employment, the Petitioner
has requested and has begun to receive Social Security retirement

7

benefits by reason of his having achieved his 65th birthday and those
benefits are paid to him in the sum of approximately $1,250 00 per month
19

The Petitioner has reasonable and necessary monthly living expenses as
follows
Rent/Mortgage

$

Property Taxes
Insurance
Maintenance
Food/Supplies
Utilities (water/gas/
electric/heat
Telephone
Laundry/Dry Clean
Clothing
Medical and Dental
Medical Insurance
Life Insurance
Union Dues
Entertainment
Incidentals
Auto expenses
Installments
Other expenses
Other expenses
Attorney's fees

$
$
$
$

TOTAL EXPENSES

20

$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$1
$
$
$

400 00 to amortize the loan or $280 00 to pay
interest only
110 00
45 00
100 00
460 00
150
55
10
50
125
30
35
14
100
100
250
176
200
380
150

00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00 (alimony)
00 (missionary cost for son on mission)
00

$3,940 00

The Respondent's refusal to waive further alimony in this case in order to
induce the Petitioner to retire so that she can receive his retirement

8

benefits which are greater than the alimony is not reasonable in the
premises

However the court cannot require the parties to behave

reasonably in settlement discussions
21

Each party to this action has incurred substantial attorney's fees, and
each party should be ordered to pay and assume his or her own court
costs and attorney s fees incurred in this action

22

Petitioner has requested that this court order that alimony terminate after
the duration of the parties' marriage, given the adoption of new statutory
law generally limiting the duration of alimony to the length of a marriage
The court declined to grant this request

23

The court did not order initially that alimony would terminate upon the
Petitioner's retirement, or at any other time, other than the Petitioner's
death or Respondent's death, remarriage or cohabitation, and from this,
this court concludes that the trial court originally did not intend alimony
ever to terminate

BASED UPON the foregoing and for good cause appearing the court now makes
and enters the following

9

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

The court has jurisdiction oyer the subject matter to this action and over
the parties to this action

2.

There has not been a substantial and material change in circumstances
warranting a modification of alimony

3.

The Petitioner does not come to this court with clean hands, and is
therefore not entitled to the relief which he is seeking

4.

The court should not modify the duration of the alimony, to terminate after
the duration of the parties' marriage
ORDER

BASED UPON the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and for good
cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
The Petitioner's petition to modify the decree of divorce is hereby dismissed,
each party ta-pay and assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees incurred in
this action

10

DATED THIS

*& day of

l/U±

*f

2001

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN L HENFHQQ * %N
District Court J u d g e V ^ A . ^

11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be mailed to
NATHAN PACE
Attorney for Respondent
136 South Main, #404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

on this

/

day of

,2001
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
RAE ADAMSON,
FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil No. D87-4654

RANAE ADAMSON,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February,
1989,

the

Honorable

Kenneth

Rigtrup,

Judge

presiding;

the

plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C.
Corporon,
through
sworn

and

the

by

and

counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard

the

testimony

defendant

of

the

appearing

parties

and

in

person

their

and

witnesses

and

the

arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being
fully

advised

in

the

premises

and more

than

90 days

having

elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, the
Court now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and defendant are now, and were for a period

of three months or more immediately prior to the filing of th<
Complaint in this action, residents of Salt Lake County, State ol
Utah.
2.

The parties to this action are husband and wife, havinc

been married on April 17, 1970.
3.

Irreconcilable

differences

have

arisen

between

the

parties, making continuation of the marriage impossible.
4.

There

have been

marriage, namely:
is a

two

children born as issue of this

Shandrae, age 15, and Tracy, age 8.

Plaintiff

fit and proper person to be awarded the permanent care,

custody

and

control

of

said

minor

children,

subject

to

defendant's rights of visitation.
5.

Defendant should be awarded visitation weekly with the

minor children, with the exact times and dates to be arranged
directly between the defendant and the parties' children.

The

Court recommends that this visitation occur either on a Saturday
or on a Sunday.

In addition, defendant should have visitation

with the minor children on alternate state and federal holidays,
on

her

birthday, and on the

children's birthday, as

arrange between herself

and the children.

should

and

have

reasonable

minor children.

she may

Further, defendant

liberal telephone

access with

the

The defendant's visitation with the children

should be unsupervised; however, in the event that the defendant
should be intoxicated at the commencement of the visitation or
become so during the course of the visitation, then the children
need not remain for the balance of the visitation.
6.

Plaintiff

should

be

ordered

to maintain

health

and

accident insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children
2

of the parties, as it is available to him through his employment.
7.
family,

It

is

reasonable., just

including

and

plaintiff, defendant

proper
and

that

the

entire

the parties' minor

children, be ordered, to submit to counseling with a qualified
family therapist, either through Salt Lake County Mental Health,
the

Utah

State

Department

of

Social

Services,

or

another

qualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the
conflict

between

the defendant

and the minor children of

the

parties.
8.

The parties have acquired an interest in a pickup truck

and a Ford automobile, which the Court finds to be of relatively
equal value, with no indebtedness owing on either.

Plaintiff

should be awarded the truck, free and clear of any interest of
the

defendant

and

the Ford Granada

should be awarded to

the

defendant free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff.
9.
incurred

During the course of their marriage the parties have
various

debts

and

obligations.

Plaintiff

should

be

ordered to pay and assume all debts and obligations incurred by
the parties
specifically,

until
any

the date of the divorce herein, including,
debt

incurred

by

defendant

for

her

living

accommodations.
10.

During the course of their marriage the parties have

acquired certain items of personal effects, jewelry, clothing and
belongings, and household furnishings, fixtures and appliances.
Defendant

should be awarded the grandfather clock, one set of

bathroom linens, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of the
tableware, pots and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual table
and chairs as her sole and separate property, free and clear of
3

any interest of the plaintiff.

Other than as set forth herein,

the parties' previous division of their items of personalty and
furniture, fixtures and appliances should be confirmed each and
each party should be awarded those items currently in his or her
possession.
11.
acquired

During the course of their marriage the parties have
an

interest

in certain real property located in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, commonly known as 4195 South 1865
East.

Plaintiff

possession
interest

of

should

said

real

be

awarded

property,

the

and

all

permanent
right,

use

and

title

and

therein, including the right to any reserve account,

free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject to the
first

and

second

mortgage

indebtedness

owing

thereon,

which

plaintiff should be ordered to pay and assume and hold defendant
harmless thereon, and defendant should be ordered to execute a
Quit-Claim Deed, quit-claiming all interest she may have in said
real property to the plaintixfW

Defendant should be awarded an

equitable lien on said real property, in the sum of Ten Thousand
Dollars

($10,000.00),

representing

her

one-half

share

of

the

equity in the real property, said lien to be non-interest-bearing
and to become payable to defendant on the first to occur of the
following events:
a.

plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation in the home

with a woman other than the defendant;
b.
of

18

years

the youngest child of the parties attaining the age
or

graduating

from

high

whichever last occurs;
c.

the death of the plaintiff;
4

school

in due

course,

d.

the

sale

of

the

real

property

at

plaintiffs

election;
e.

plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as

his primary place of residence.
12.

Plaintiff has acquired an interest in a retirement plan

through his employment with the State of Utah, which should be
divided equally between the parties, according to the

Woodward

formula, and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should issue
from this Court.
13-

Both

employable.

parties

to

this

However, defendant

action

are

able-bodied

is in need of support.

and

It is

reasonable, just and proper that plaintiff be ordered to pay to
defendant the sum of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as
and for alimony, commencing with the month of February 1989, and
continuing
until

until

defendant's

occurs, or until

the death

of

remarriage

the plaintiff or defendant, or

or

cohabitation, whichever

further order of this Court.

first

This award of

alimony is subject to review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at
8:30 a.m., before the assigned judge.
14.

Defendant should be ordered to pursue all employment

opportunities
her,

and all

including,

assistance

with

job training opportunities

but

not

limited

the

following:

to,

making

the

Phoenix

available to

application

for

Institute,

Job

Service, Utah State Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, the
Utah

State

Department

of

Social

Services

and

colleges

universities in the Salt Lake area for a PELL grant.

and

Further,

defendant should be ordered to make a reasonable and concerted
effort to obtain employment, including making contacts through

Job Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of
three

applications

employers.

for

employment

per

week

with

prospective

Defendant should be ordered to report her job search

efforts to this Court at the hearing on July 7, 1989.
15.

It is reasonable, just and proper that the Court impute

a minimum

wage

assessing
Court

the

does

income earning capability
defendant's

so, and

imputes

income in the gross
month.
monthly

for child

to defendant

the

Court

finds

that

the

support.

ability

sum of Six Hundred Dollars

Further, the
income

obligation

to the defendant

to

in
The

earn

($600.00) per

plaintiff's

gross

is in the sum of Two Thousand One Hundred Ten

Dollars ($2,110.00) per month.

Based upon these income figures,

the Court calculates defendant's child support obligation to be
Seventy-Five

Dollars

($75.00) per month, per child, commencing

with the month of February 19 89 and continuing until such time as
the minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from
high school in the normal course of their high school educations,
whichever event occurs later.

In any month when the defendant

fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child
support, the child

support shall be deducted

from

defendant's

lien upon the marital residence of the parties.
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff should be entitled
to mandatory

income withholding

relief, pursuant to Utah

Code

Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988).
16.

It is reasonable, just and proper that each party pay

and assume his or her own court costs and attorney's fees.
17.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all
6

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein.
FROM THE FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to this

action and over the subject matter of this action.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from the

defendant, dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing
between

the

parties, the

same

to

become

final

and

effective

immediately upon being signed by the Judge and entered by the
Clerk in the register of actions.
3.

The Decree of Divorce granted to plaintiff should be in

conformance with the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED THIS

%6 ~~day of

rW:t/
BY THE COURT

i f 7 t j 7
KENNETH RIGTRUP U
District Court Judge

7

, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

HEREBY

CERTIFY

that

I am

employed

in the

offices

of

Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that
I caused the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law to be served upon defendant by placing a true and correct
copy of the same in an envelope addressed to:
JEFFREY C. HUNT
Attorney for Defendant
22 5 South 200 East
Suite 230
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah
on the

day of February, 1989.

. )VLl'JtLs
Secretary

i\ .

fur cm i i-^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
RAE ADAMSON,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil No. D87-4654

RANAE ADAMSON,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Defendant•

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on for trial before
the above-entitled court on Thursday, the 9th day of February,
1989,

the

Honorable

Kenneth

Rigtrup,

Judge

presiding;

the

plaintiff appearing in person and by and through counsel, Mary C.
Corporon,

and

the

defendant

appearing

in person

and

by

and

through counsel, Jeffrey C. Hunt, the Court having heard the
sworn

testimony

of

the

parties

and

their

witnesses

and

the

arguments of counsel, and the Court having reviewed the file and
the pleadings contained therein; based thereon, the Court being
fully

advised

in

the

premises

and more

than

9 0 days

having

elapsed since the filing of the Complaint in this action, and the
Court and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, now, therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

Plaintiff

is

hereby

granted

a

Decree

of

Divorce,

dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the
parties, the same to become final and effective immediately upon
being

signed

by

the

Judge

and

entered

by

the clerk in the

register of actions•
2.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the permanent care, custody

and control of the minor children of the parties, Shandrae and
Tracy.
3.

Defendant is hereby awarded visitation weekly with the

minor children, with the exact times and dates to be arranged
directly between the defendant and the parties' children, taking
into

consideration

visitation

occur

the

either

Court's
on a

recommendation

Saturday

or

on

that

a Sunday.

this
In

addition, defendant is awarded visitation with the minor children
on alternate state and federal holidays, on her birthday, and on
the children's birthday, as she may arrange between herself and
the children.
liberal

Further,

telephone

aiccess

defendant
with

is
the

awarded
minor

reasonable
children.

and
The

defendant's visitation with the children shall be unsupervised;
however, in the event that the defendant should be intoxicated at
the commencement of the visitation or become so during the course
of the visitation, the children shall not be required to visit
with the defendant on that occasion.
4.

Plaintiff

is ordered to maintain health and accident

insurance coverage for the benefit of the minor children of the
parties, as it is available to him through his employment.
5.

Plaintiff, defendant and the parties' minor children,

are hereby ordered

to

submit to counseling
2

with

a qualified

amily therapist, either through Salt Lake County Mental Health,
he

Utah

State

Department

of

Social

Services,

or

another

[ualified counselor or therapist, for purposes of resolving the
onflict between the defendant

and the minor children of the

>arties.
6.
Lny

Plaintiff is hereby awarded the truck, free and clear of

interest of the defendant and defendant is hereby awarded the

'ord Granada, free and clear of any interest of the plaintiff,
7.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay and assume all debts and

ibligations incurred by the parties until the date of the divorce
Lerein, including, specifically, any debt incurred by defendant
or her living accommodations.
8.

The

parties'

previous

division

of

their

items

of

>ersonal effects, jewelry, clothing and belongings, and household
"urnishings, fixtures and appliances is hereby confirmed in each
md each party is awarded those items currently in his or her own
>ossession, with the exception of the following items, which are
lereby awarded to the defendant:

the grandfather clock, one set

>f bathroom linens, her sister's couch, a reasonable portion of
:he tableware, pots and pans and bedroom linens, and the casual
:able and chairs.
9.

Plaintiff

is

hereby

awarded

the

permanent

use

and

possession of the real property of the parties located at 4195
^uth 1865 East in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, and all right,
.tie and interest therein, including the right to any reserve
count, free and clear of any interest of the defendant, subject
) the

first

and second mortgage

hich plaintiff

indebtedness

owing

thereon,

is hereby ordered to pay and assume and hold
3

defendant

harmless

thereon.

Defendant

is

hereby

ordered

to

execute a Quit-Claim Deed, quit-claiming all interest she may
have in said real property to the plaintiff./

Further, defendant

is hereby awarded a non-interest bearing equitable lien on said
real property, in the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00),
representing
property,

her

one-half

payable

upon

share

the

of

first

the

to

equity

occur

of

in
the

the

real

following

events:
a.

plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation in the home

with woman other than the defendant;
b.
of

18 years

the youngest child of the parties attaining the age
or

graduating

from

high

school

in due course,

whichever last occurs;
c.
d.

the death of the plaintiff;
the

sale

of

the

real

property

at

plaintiff's

election;
e.

plaintiff's ceasing to use said real property as

his primary place of residence.
10.

Plaintiff's retirement plan through his employment with

the State of Utah, is ordered to be divided between the parties,
according

to

the

Woodward

formula, and

a Qualified

Domestic

Relations Order shall issue from this Court.
11.

Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to defendant the sum

of Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month, as and for alimony,
commencing with the month of February 19 89, and continuing until
the

death

remarriage

of

the

plaintiff

or

defendant,

or cohabitation, whichever

further order of this Court.

first

until

defendant's

occurs, or until

This award of alimony is subject to
4

review by this Court on July 7, 1989 at 8:30 a.m., before the
assigned judge.
12.

Defendant is hereby ordered to pursue all employment

opportunities and all job training opportunities available to her
as set

forth in the Findings of Fact entered by this Court.

Further, defendant is ordered to make a reasonable and concerted
sffort to obtain employment, including making contacts through
Job Service, private employment agencies, and making a minimum of
three

applications

for

employment

per

week

with

prospective

employers and is ordered to report her job search efforts to this
Zourt at the hearing on July 7, 1989.
13-

Defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum

of Seventy-Five Dollars ($75.00) per month, per child, commencing
tfith the month of February 19 89 and continuing until such time as
Lhe minor children achieve the age of 18 years or graduate from
ligh school in the normal course of their high school educations,
whichever event occurs later.

In any month when the defendant

fails to make an actual monetary payment to plaintiff for child
support, said child support shall be deducted from defendant's
lien on the marital residence of the parties.
In the event the defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears
in her child support obligation, the plaintiff shall be entitled
to mandatory income withholding relief, pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 62A-11-401, et. seq. (Supp. 1988).
14.

Each party is ordered to pay and assume his or her own

court costs and attorney's fees.
15.

Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver all

necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership of the
5

property of the parties pursuant to the Decree entered herein.
DATED THIS

?^0'~"day Of

Jt\aA6^
BY THE COURT

KENNETH RIGTRUP
D i s t r i c t Court Judge

6

, 13 39.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

HEREBY

CERTIFY

that

I am employed

in

the offices of

orporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that
caused the foregoing proposed Decree of Divorce

to be served

ipon defendant by placing a true and correct copy of the same in
m envelope addressed to:
JEFFREY C. HUNT
Attorney for Defendant
225 South 200 East
Suite 230
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

ind depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah
Dn the

Ay-

day of February, 1989.

Secretary

cy

